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FoREIGN TAX POLICY AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
THE foreign tax policy of a nation consists of its tax policy towards
its nationals and organizations as far as their dealings abroad are con-
cerned and towards foreign individuals and organizations as far as
they become subject to its taxing powers. A nation's policy decisions
with respect to these matters vary with the nature of its basic economic
characteristics and also with its orientation in foreign economic policy.
It is inevitable that in a world of limited trade and scant international
cooperation certain countries will feel coerced to take discriminatory
and "protective" measures. Moreover, it must be understood that
not all discriminatory or protective measures are essentially restrictive
of international trade or investment. In some instances they may lead
to an "extension of a partial free trade area." I Yet even if there were
completely free trade and flow of investment, periods of transition and
temporary disturbances might warrant special tax measures. The
need for economic development and the lack of foreign exchange are
causes which may induce a country to use a protectionist or discrimi-
natory tax policy for the achievement of general economic aims.
There are a few specific areas in which taxation eo ipso can interfere
with the normal development of international economic relations or
where it can be used to correct a lack of balance. Taxes (apart from
tariffs) can be used to discriminate against imported merchandise.2
Use taxes, consumption taxes, excises of various types can function as
trade barriers.and have often been used in addition to or in lieu of
tariffs. Taxes can be levied in such a way as to discriminate against
articles earmarked for export.3
t H. S. Bloch is a member of the Division of Tax Research and C. E. Heilemann of the
Office of the Tax Legislative Counsel in the United States Treasury Department, The
views expressed by the authors are stated as their own, and no attempt is made t6 represent
the position of the Treasury Department. Thanks for useful comments are due to Messrs.
J. L. Mosak of the Office of Economic Stabilization and Earl Hicks of the Treasury De-
partment.
1. Compare Bernstein, British Policy and a World Economy (Dec. 1945) 35 AM.
EcoN. REv. 891 et seg., especially at 907. Dr. Bernstein's article shows the various effects
of protection measures under different economic conditions which apply not only to the
British Empire, but have general significance.
2. E.g., the United States internal revenue taxes on oleomargarine and filled cheese,
INT. RE V. CODE §§ 2306, 2356 (1940).
3. Export duties have been widely used in varying forms. Some South American
countries make extensive use of export duties. See GROVES, FINANcING GOVERNMiNT
(1939) 444. Prior to World War II, Italy levied special export duties on materials which
were considered either critical or strategic. This is evident from the list of the articles given
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Foreign capital can be discouraged by discriminatory levies 4 or by
generally high taxes, or it can be encouraged by the prospect of gen-
erally low rates of taxation or by rates which are especially lov for
foreign capital. Domestic capitalists can be discouraged from invest-
ing abroad by special tax discrimination or they can be encouraged to
do so through advantages offered especially to capital invested abroad.5
In all these cases, taxation is likely to be one of many factors deter-
mining either the movement of goods, capital and persons or the loca-
tion of enterprises.' Its marginal effect varies from case to case. In
general, prohibitive and restrictive policies can better be enforced
through administrative devices of a more direct nature than by tax
policy. Tax incentives, however, can often be effectively added to
generally favorable conditions, and while they are not likely to reverse
trends in movements of capital or persons, they can contribute to such
developments and sometimes foster an existing trend. In any case, tax
differentials can have a considerable effect on profit margins. It is
therefore possible that investors, either public or private, may seek
and obtain tax advantages from capital-hungry countries. Bargaining
for tax privileges can appear as an element of no mean importance in
international economic negotiations between governments and between
governments and private groups.
CERTAIN ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MAIULTIPLE TAXATION
It is doubtful whether superimposition of taxes by several govern-
mental authorities should be considered obnoious per se, and it is
even more doubtful whether it is always restrictive of international
trade.
7
However, even a tax policy intended to be neutral may be an im-
portant element in international trade problems. Tax systems that
contain no attempt to influence international trade may involve acci-
in The Italian Tax System as of January 1, 1935, Tx S 'sTEs OF THE WORLD (Tax Re-
search Foundation, 7th ed. 1938) 313. See also various references to the use of export duties
in DALTON, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1936).
4. Italy had a special tax of 4.5% on the capital invested by foreign companies in
Italian territory. See TAx SYsTEs OF THE WORLD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 312. Other
countries, including, for instance, Greece and Denmark, practiced similar discriminations.
5. See China Trade Act, INr. Rnv. CODE §§ 261-265 (1940); tax provisions for Ameri-
can business in United States possessions, INT. REV. CODE §§ 251-252 (1940); provisions for
Western Hemisphere Corporations, INT. REv. CODE § 109 (1940).
6. The "flight tax" or "emigration tax" applied by N.zi Germany to emigrating
refugees who exported their capital was an example of a combination of tax discrimination
with a whole scheme of administrative devices. See 2 HENGOELER, DAs IN-rP r, 1OZOAL
STEUERRECHT DES ERDBALLS (Feb. 1940) 532-a(15).
7. Multiple taxation by governmental units in a federal system can be planned and
systematized on the basis of principles governing allocation of revenues. Similar principles
could conceivably work on an international basis.
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dental multiple taxation that can have considerable effect on inter-
national trade. Very high excise taxes which lead to an increase of the
price of the taxed product may have an effect similar to that of customs
duties. Moderate excises imposed by the exporting country to which
are added similar taxes by countries of transit or importing countries
may cumulatively have the same effect and ultimately result in a re-
duction of the total volume of trade.
It has been stated that multiple taxation interferes with interna-
tional investment (meaning direct entrepreneurial investment). If a
capital exporting country levies taxes on its enterprises abroad, as does
the United States, and these enterprises are taxed by foreign govern-
ments as well, one might argue that the entrepreneur is in a less favor-
able position abroad than the foreign entrepreneur who is taxed only
by his native country. Supposing thaf this were true, could one make
an economic case for the reduction of tax rates for foreign enterprises
to a lower level than that which applies to domestic enterprises? TFrom
an economic point of view this amounts to a subsidy. A reduction for
one group of taxpayers results in a relatively greater load for others.
It discriminates in favor of national enterprises abroad as against na-
tional enterprises at home.
On general economic principles such discrimination is objectionable,8
but special causes may justify subsidies to domestic firms abroad on
economic grounds just as there may be special reasons for subsidizing
domestic investment. An example would be the subsidizing of an
entrepreneur who mines a metal abroad which cannot be found at
home and which is necessary as a raw material for domestic production.
Even in this case it must be established that private entrepreneurs can
do the job better and cheaper than a government agency and that
loans to a foreign country or company would not achieve better results.
Moreover, if it is established that a subsidy is economically desirable,
the form of the subsidy must be 'considered, and the tax subsidy must
be compared with other types; income tax reductions are always of
greater value to firms making Jlarge profits than to firms making small
profits and of no value to firms suffering losses.
If one compares the position of the entrepreneur from a rich and
highly developed country who operates in countries which are less de-
veloped with the position of the native entrepreneur, it appears that
he has a number of advantages which may outweigh his disadvantages
due to a higher tax burden.' He is often a monopolist or a quasi-
monopolist because~of concessions he is able to obtain, and sometimes
8. Non-economic arguments, especially those based on considerations of military
strategy, can be made even if there is no economic justification.




he has better access to raw material than native entrepreneurs. If the
entrepreneur from the rich and highly developed country is a corpora-
tion which operates on a high level of vertical integration, it can cut
its costs considerably below that of competitors. Technical experience
and knowledge and the ownership of patents often give such entre-
preneurs a head start in undeveloped regions.
Another advantage of the entrepreneur from a wealthy country is
easier access to capital and, therefore, mass production. Even if he
operates on a small scale he usually can obtain a much lower rate of
interest in his country than the native of poor or undeveloped coun-
tries. The heavier interest burden for native entrepreneurs 10 means
that a higher proportion of the marginal yield of the investment of the
native entrepreneur goes towards the payment of interest, and there-
fore the marginal increment of his investment must yield higher re-
turns than that of the foreign investor domiciled in a rich country."
A capital importing country may find that multiple tax burdens
restrict capital investment. Such a country could justify low rates for
foreign entrepreneurs or even special exemptions on general economic
grounds. Foreign investment may be a conditio sine qua non for the
development of the country. Even in this case, it must be recognized
that direct entrepreneurial investment is not the only type of foreign
investment. The Agreements of Bretton Woods, while according
recognition to the desirability of international direct investment, give
new importance to indirect investment through international loans.
Such loans are fostered in particular for countries which cannot find
capital at low interest on the open market and which are in need of
funds for reconstruction or general economic development. This may
appear to many governments as a more desirable and a more effective
means of stimulating development than the use of tax privileges for
foreign entrepreneurs.
Quite apart from strictly economic considerations, a case can be
made against multiple taxation because of inequities which it may
produce. The query is whether persons or firms in identical economic
positions should be subject to unequal taxation merely because they
have international contacts. Just as there is no equity in special privi-
leges, it is contrary to principles of equity to impose on one group a
heavier tax burden than on another in a similar position.
10. The native investor can sometimes borrow in the foreign country, but he anually
has to pay higher rates than nationals of that country. In view of the capital ohortage in
undeveloped countries, native entrepreneurs must almost alvays borrow if they engage in
large-scale investments.
11. This is explained in an article by Yuan-Li Wu, International Capital. Inestr n
and the Derelopraent of Poor Countries (1946) 56 Eco.mmc Jouu;AL 86. The author refera
to interest rates paid by entrepreneurs in China as ranging from 12 to 20%.
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SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL TAX CONFLICT
In scanning the economic aspects, stress has been laid both on the
use of taxation as an instrument of foreign policy and on the effects of
multiple taxation. 12 Examination of the legal background reveals that
concepts of jurisdiction to tax underlie both of these problems.
Three widely accepted principles of jurisdiction may be generalized:
(1) location of the item of taxation-situs of property or source of
income; (2) location of the taxpayer-residence or domicile; and (3)
nationality of the taxpayer. The claims which are made in support of
each principle are familiar. The jurisdiction of situs or source finds
the wealth within its power and affords it protection; the place of the
taxpayer's, residence or domicile has power over his person and confers
its benefits upon him; the country of his nationality has the bond of
political allegiance and affords him, in addition to other rights and
privileges, its diplomatic services abroad.
Inasmuch as a nation need not limit itself to one principle of juris-
diction alone and may interpret the principles quite broadly, it can
find legal basis for a wide use of the instrument of taxation. Moreover,
it is not curbed under international law by the fact that multiple
taxation or discrimination against aliens results from its actions. 3
That nations may and do proceed in this manner produces multiple
taxation, for one jurisdiction, looking primarily to the item of taxation
under one concept, may levy its tax on a transaction, while another
jurisdiction, using a concept which looks primarily at the taxpayer,
may levy its tax on that taxpayer with respect to the same transaction.
The possibilities for multiple taxation are further extended by the
broad interpretations which may be given to the principles of juris-
diction. Thus two countries employing the concept of situs may each
find, under different interpretations, that an item is situated within
its sphere of taxability, and both may levy tax upon it. If a nation,
through its internal laws or its treaty arrangements, exercises restraint,
it does so for reasons of policy such as have been mentioned above and
not because of established barriers of international law.14
12. Other economic aspects are outlined in connection with problems of evasion, avoid-
ance and intergovernmental activity. See text discussion infra, at 1167, 1170.
13. 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1945) 664, 666, 672, 674; but see letter from Secre-
tary of State to chargg at Bogota, April 28, 1888 quoted in 2 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
DIGEST (1906) 59.
14. One barrier to taxation which is established sufficiently to have the force of law is
that against taxation of another sovereign nation. DEPERON, INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE
TAXATION (1945) 6; French Republic v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Ky. 18, 252 S. W. 124
(1923). How far this principle may be carried is, nonetheless, far from well established.
The income of another government may not be taxed, but does this apply to the income of a
corporate instrumentality of a foreign government? I.T. 3789, 1946-6 INT. REv. BULL. 5.
An ambassador, as the embodiment of his country, may be immune from excises of the
(Vol. 55 :11581162
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Should a policy of restraint recommend itself, a nation may adopt
one or more unilateral approaches. It may limit itself to one principle
of jurisdiction for taxation as the Union of South Africa, for example,
has done, selecting the principle of source of income as the sole criterion
in levying its income tax.'5 It may grant outright exemption to certain
classes of income from foreign sources 11 or to foreigners on certain
classes of domestic income. 17 Foreign taxes on income from foreign
sources may be allowed, in whole or in part, as a deduction from (or
credit against) domestic tax on that inc6me.' s
In view of difficulties in determining the correct amount of tax for
which credit should be given, the credit system cannot be described
as the simplest device for elimination of tax conflicts. Outright ex-
emption is for simpler. Unlike outright exemption, however, the
credit system assures that the taxpayer will not escape taxation com-
pletely through some quirk of circumstance. Indeed its effect is to
leave the taxpayer with at least the burden of paying the amount
levied by the country with the higher rate of taxation. Furthermore,
the credit does not remove the foreign income from the tax base of the
crediting country, an important consideration if the tax is levied at
progressive rates. It will be observed that the credit also is free of the
economic consequences described above, which attach to the exemption.
One of the interesting possibilities which appears in connection with
the United States income tax credit is the willingness of this country
to give the credit to resident aliens, provided that their countries of
receiving state. Should distinctions be drawn in the case of consular officers? 'M. T. 7,
1943 Cum. BuLL. 1151; HYDE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 1276, 1337 ct scq.
15. Act No. 31 of 1941, § 7, as amended by Act No. 34 of 1942 and by Act No. 26 of
1943; BARNEs, I.NcouE TAx HANDDBOOK (5th ed. 1944) 2.
16. See note 5 supra. Compare the exemptions conferred under the United Kingdom
income tax on certain income from foreign sources not brought into the United Kingdom,
KoNsis, THE LAw OF INcomE TAx (9th ed. 1943) 792 et scq.
17. The taxation of nonresident aliens, not engaged in trade or buEinezs in the United
States, only on fixed or determinable, annual or periodical income from sources in the
United States, thus foregoing taxation on capital gains or occasional zales is an instance in
point. INT. REv. CODE § 211 (1940).
18. In the income tax field the United States led off with a credit for foreign tases3 in
§§ 222 and 238 of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 STr.T. 1073, 1080. Canada followed vith a
comparable device in 1919. In lieu of an expedient used in World War I, the British adopted,
by § 27 of the Finance Act of 1920 (10 & 11 GEo. V, c. 31), a partial credit for "Dominion"
taxes equivalent, in the case of a like arrangement on the part of the Dominion, to the Do-
minion tax or one-half the United Kingdom tax, whichever is smaller, with additional relief
where the Dominion does not afford relief from United Kingdom tax. Ko.;smr , op. ct.
supra note 7, at 24 et seq. Application to other countries ith which agreements are con-
cluded, and technical changes in this relief were effected by Part V and the Seventh Schedule
of the Finance Act of 1945 (9 & 10 GEo. 6, c. 13) in connection with the British program
for reciprocal agreements on avoidance of double taxation. This legislation is dicussed in
THE EcoNoMIsT (1945) 721.
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origin reciprocate in the case of American citizens situated there."
The idea is by no means unique, other countries having offered income
tax exemptions on condition of reciprocity."0 This approach is espe-
cially valuable in that it makes possible the elimination of tax conflicts
without the formalities and delays of treaty negotiations.
In treaty solutions of international tax conflicts, three principal
avenues of approach are apparent. The first may be designated as
"elimination of discrimination," the second as "relief from multiple
taxation," and the third as "administrative cooperation." 21
The standard tax clauses of treaties of friendship and commerce are
illustrative of the first. Typically, they are prohibitions against the
imposition of higher taxes on the nationals of the one party to the
treaty by the other party than the latter imposes on its own nationals. 22
It should be noted that a typical clause of this nature has been inter-
preted by the United States Treasury Department as applicable only
in the case of aliens resident within the United States, an interpretation
which has been adhered to by the Department of State.23 But with
the greater number of alien taxpayers within the jurisdiction, it fol-
lows that such clauses, even thus limited, will operate to prevent dis-
crimination in the majority of cases. It will be observed at once that
such clauses, while extensive in the number of cases covered, are
limited in function. They secure no special privilege, nor are they
designed to relieve the burdens of double taxation; they are negative,
not positive in their nature. The only treaty approach which can be
more limited in character is the "most favored nation clause" which
19. INT. REV. CODE § 131 (a) (3) (1940); a similar policy is pursued in the case of the
taxation of shipping profits, the United States having expressed itself as willing to exempt
the profits of vessels registered in another nation if that country will reciprocate in the
exemption of ships of American registry. INT. REV. CODE § 212 (b), 231 (d) (1940); ef.
Article 30 of the Brazilian Decree-Law No. 5.844 with respect to air as well as maritime
navigation.
20. Carroll, Developments in International Tax Law in 1937 (1938) 16 TAx MAGAZINE
75, 77.
21. A fourth, but minor type is the treaty provision seeking to protect nationals of one
State from extraordinary or special levies of the other State. See the treaty between France
and Spain of January 19, 1862, Art. V, par. 2: "Subjects of each of the two States are exempt
in the other State from all military service, from all requisitions or war contributions, from
advances or loans and all other extraordinary contributions which may be established as
the result of exceptional circumstances, insofar as these contributions are not imposed on
real property." Compare the treaty between France and Great Britain of February 28,
1882, Art. X.
22. "The nationals of either High Contracting Party within the territory of the other
shall not be subjected to the payment of any internal charges or taxes other or higher than
those that are exacted of and paid by its nationals." Art. I, Treaty of .June 5, 1928 between
the United States and Norway, 4 UNITED STATES TREATIES, 4528. Compare Art. IV of
the same treaty with respect to death duties. Id. at 4529; HYDE, op. Cit. supra note 13, at
664, n. 3.
23. 3 HACKWORTm, DIGEST (1942) 577.
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secures only non-discrimination as between aliens and leaves the
countries free to favor their own nationals.
As noted before, in the absence of treaty provisions there is no gen-
erally recognized rule forbidding imposition of higher burdens upon
aliens than upon the nationals of the taxing jurisdiction.24 Further-
more, in the absence of the ability of one state to enforce its tax claims
within the limits of another state,2 5 any attempt to treat aliens and
nationals alike in all respects may be found to be impracticable by
reason of the fact that non-resident alien taxpayers will be beyond the
power of the state. Only their incomes or property -will be subject to
control. A distinction between non-resident aliens and other taxpayers
thus becomes convenient. Experience may dictate, as it has in the
case of the United States, that a different system of taxing non-resident
aliens from that employed in the case of citizens and residents is prac-
ticable or productive of revenue.-" Again, if the non-resident alien is
to be taxed only on his income or property within the jurisdiction while
the citizen or resident alien must bear progressive taxation on the
totality of his income or property, equity will argue for allowing the
non-resident alien smaller exemptions, credits or deductions in the
computation of his tax.27
The most interesting of the treaties dra-wn up to prevent multiple
taxation are treaties dealing with income and estate taxes. 3 As vith
unilateral action, outright exemption and credit for foreign tax are the
fundamental tools.-" A combination of both may be worked out so
that with respect to some items of income or property, double taxation
is eliminated by agreement that only one country shall tax, while with
regard to other items relief may be sought through the credit.z The
comparisons made between outright exemption and credit in the dis-
cussion of unilateral solutions hold true as well for treaties. Thus the
24. See note 12 and text discussion supra, at 1162.
25. 3 BEALE, CoNFLIcr OF LAWS (1935) pars. 610.1. 610.2; Sack, Non-Enforement of
Foreign Revenue Laws in International Law (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 559; Deperon,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 6.
26. IwT. Rnv. CODE § 211 el seg.; Report of Ways and Means Committee on Revenue
Bill of 1936, H. R. REP. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 9 el seq.; Report of Senate
Finance Committee on Revenue Bill of 1936, SEN. REP. No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d Se::.
(1936) 21 et seq.
27. Compare INT. REv. CODE §§ 812, 861 (1940).
28. Mention should be made, however, of treaties to prevent double taxation of Ealeo,
the multilateral convention on stamp laws signed at Geneva on June 7, 1930 and March 19,
1931, and the Geneva convention on the taxation of motor vehicles of March 30. 1031.
29. Agreements to give reduced rates on particular types of income moving from one
country to the other are not unknown. See Article VII of the United Statez-SwedLn con-
vention of 1939 with respect to a reduced rate on certain dividends and Article IX of the
pending United States-United Kingdom convention for elimination of double taxation of
income with respect to a reduced rate on real property rentals and mineral royaltie5.
30. As a matter of fact, a convention which employs the credit is li:ely to be a combi-
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principle of exemption recommends itself by reason of simplicity, but
it has economic consequences and effects upon progressive taxation not
attendant upon the credit.
Whether an exemption or a credit type treaty is written, decision
must be made as to which country shall have priority, or, to state it
from the other side, which country shall give up the right to tax or
shall give credit for the other's tax. This means, in the case of the
exemption type treaty, that either the jurisdiction of the source of
income or the situs of property will be selected as the jurisdiction to
levy thetax, and the jurisdiction of residence, domicile or nationality
will be the jurisdiction which it is agreed will give up the tax; or, con-
trariwise, the jurisdiction of source or situs will give up taxing and the
other jurisdiction will be permitted to go on collecting the tax. Of
course, income will be flowing both ways so that for some transactions
one country will be the jurisdiction of source, whereas in other instances
the second country will be the source, the same being true of situs. If
the relation between the countries is such that one is predominantly a
creditor, in the sense that its nationals are investors or entrepreneurs
in the other, the balance of the flow of income will be from the debtor
nation, and the greater part of property subject to taxation by both
countries will be located there.3 It has been observed 32 that as a
result, creditor nations prefer the domicile type treaty and debtor na-
tions the situs or source approach. On the other hand, a country in
need of capital may be willing to forego taxing the return on that capi-
tal, at least for a limited period of time, and may, therefore, be willing
to enter an exemption type treaty based on domicile for a number of
years.
Just as credit and exemption may be mixed, so also may source and
domicile. It is possible on some items of income or property to favor
the jurisdiction of source while in the same treaty awarding the juris-
diction of domicile the right to tax other items. 33
Theoretically, this same choice between source and domicile must
be made in agreeing upon a credit treaty. As a matter of practice,
nation of methods. With respect to foreign business with no permanent establishment in
the country, personal compensation of aliens temporarily present in the country, and like
items, the exemption is generally preferred. Thus all existing effective United States double
tax treaties use a combination of credit and exemption.
31. This situation may be reduced to the extent that investors and entrepreneurs from
the creditor nation, leaving most of their income-producing property there, locate in the
debtor country.
32. Ke Chin Wang, International Double Taxation of Income: Relief Through Interna-
tional Agreement, 1921-1945 (1945) 59 HARV. L. REv. 73, 114; DEIPERON, Op. Cit. S1pra
note 14, at 13.
33. The pending United States-United Kingdom income tax treaty is an instance in
point, source being favored on business income, dividends, rents and mineral royalties,
domicile being favored on interest, copyright royalties, and educators' salaries.
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recognition is given to the jurisdiction of source as the primary taxing
jurisdiction, and the country of domicile gives the credit.
In items of income covered, the model income tax treaty recom-
mended by the League of Nations experts at their conference in M1exico
City is representative. This treaty includes provisions with respect to
income from real property, industrial, commercial and agricultural
enterprises conducted in both countries, ships and aircraft, compensa-
tion for personal services, government salaries and public pensions,
income from movable capital, royalties from immovable property,
patents, formulas, trademarks and copyrights, private pensions and
annuities.
34
The most intricate problem encountered in many of the income tax
treaties is that of the business establishment with headquarters in one
country but carrying on operations in both. If transactions between
parent and branch or subsidiary are arranged as though their relations
were those of independent establishments, it is comparatively easy to
determine the income arising in each country. But to take care of
instances where the relations are not on an arm's length basis, the
contracting countries may agree to allocate according to formulae
which may, for example, be based on gross income, sales, or a relation-
ship of receipts" or assets of the branch to those of the parent.
The model estate tax convention deals with the location of real
property and business property but leaves unsettled the situs of such
items of personal property as stock, bonds, debts, corporeal moveables
and bank deposits, often specified in treaties of this nature. An estate
tax treaty outside the typical pattern is that concluded by the United
States and Canada in 1945. Rather than specifying the situs of items
of property, it provides that the jurisdiction levying a tax by reason
of nationality or domicile must give a credit for the tax of the other
country on property which, according to the latter's rules of law, is
situated therein.
AvomANcE AND EVAsioN: THc PROBLEr AND ITS SOLUTIONS
Frequently, conventions aimed at preventing double taxation are
accompanied by provisions for cooperation in the administration of
the revenue laws of the contracting states. Treaties have also been
addressed to this subject alone. In glancing at them -ome profit is to
be gained by applying the familiar distinctions between tax avoidance
and tax evasion to the international tax picture.
With "tax 'avoidance" understood to mean legal means taken by
a taxpayer to reduce or eliminate taxes, it becomes apparent that "tax
34. For a more detailed analysis of the provision of the model convention on incomre
tax recommended at the Me.rdco City conference see DEPERON, op. Cit. SUPra note 14,
at 22-27.
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avoidance" is readily possible in a -world of variegated tax systems.
By foreswearing any connection with a country of high taxes and con-
centrating his interests and activities in countries of low taxation, the
taxpayer can "avoid" taxes. Of course, a nation can make its taxes
more difficult to avoid by widening the scope of its tax base, i.e.,
increasing the number of items upon which its taxes are levied. In
other words, the taxpayer may avoid taxation by reducing the number
of factors which connect him with a country; the country may make
avoidance more difficult by increasing as a legal proposition the number
of criteria which are sufficient to cause it to impose tax.
This does not hold true with the same force for "tax evasion," under-
stood as illegal reduction or escape from taxation. Ease of evasion de-
pends more on the nature of the taxation and the manner of its admin-
istration. It may still be true that the fewer contacts the taxpayer has
with the taxing jurisdiction, the easier it will be to escape detection,
but it does not necessarily follow that the fewer the bases for taxation
the greater evasion will be. Indeed the reverse may be the case. While
this qualification must be accepted, it is nonetheless possible that by
giving up tax bases a country may create possibilities for the taxpayer
to put on the appearance of falling outside the area of taxability.
Both avoidance and evasion result in tax leakages, thus reducing
the total tax yield. Avoidance is as inequitable as evasion if the avenue
of avoidance is only open to one category of taxpayers and not to
another, although both are in the same economic position.
These elementary observations lead to some highly interesting con-
clusions when applied to tax conventions designed to prevent double
taxation. Since the credit type of treaty does not reduce the bases
upon which either party to it may levy taxes and results merely in the
taxpayer paying an amount of taxes equal to the higher tax, it does not
increase the opportunities for tax avoidance. It cannot prevent the
taxpayer from minimizing his contacts with the higher taxing jurisdic-
tion, but it does not permit him to retain those contacts and pay only
the lower tax because the higher taxing jurisdiction has surrendered
the right to tax. However, the tax convention which grants outright
exemptions does just this. It may, therefore, be stated that an outright
exemptions treaty increases the opportunities for tax avoidance.
Where the opportunities lie at any particular time will depend on the
comparative rates of the two parties to the treaty at that time.
Likewise, since the credit type treaty does not alter taxability, nor
the manner in which the tax is administered, it does not promote
evasion. On the other hand, the exemption type treaty creates pos-
sibilities for the taxpayer to give the appearance of falling within the
exemption created and thus multiplies the possibilities of evasion as
well as of avoidance.
To point out the superiority of the tax credit convention, so far as
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avoidance and evasion are concerned, does not lead to the conclusion
that parties to such a treaty will have no interest in cooperating in the
collection of their taxes through sharing of information or assistance
of legal processes. Having adopted a course which does not encourage
avoidance, there is little else they can do in this respect, for avoidance
then depends on their internal laws and its reduction must be met by
unilateral action. But evasion will persist unless there is cooperation.
The outright exemption countries, while they have agreed to possi-
bilities of avoidance, have an interest similar to that of credit countries
in preventing evasion and a greater need because of the greater suscepti-
bility to evasion which they may have created.
Capital movements are probably not considerably influenced by the
desire to avoid or evade taxation. Specific transfers of capital and even
of residence and citizenship have, however, been undertaken in order
to make it possible to reduce the tax load in individual cases., Inter-
national cooperation in this field has been handicapped by an attitude
which has often identified the tax evader as a political rather than an
ordinary criminaUlY During the period of the Nazi regime the fiscal
laws of Germany have often been considered as immoral or contrary
to the public order by other European nations, and international en-
forcement of fiscal claims was therefore an impossibility. If capital
movements become freer and as the normal flows of trade are resumed,
international concern with problems of evasion must become greater.
As exchange controls are reduced and as other controls are loosened,
it is quite possible that tax-motivated capital movements will become
important. Many European countries are imposing capital levies, and
if international collaboration against tax evaders is not strengthened,
wealthy taxpayers could again resort to the use of capital transfers to
avoid the impact of national legislation. s
The two principal lines of attack on evasion have already been men-
tioned. They are sharing of information on taxpayers and taxpayer
activities and the use of legal processes to collect not only the taxes of
the enforcing jurisdiction but also the taxes of the other jurisdiction.
Sharing information on taxpayers may be -iewed as a mixed good,
for there can be no assurance that a particular piece of information
communicated to the other state will be used only for tax purposes.
The problem is one of finding a balance between giving and obtaining
35. Hay v. Comm'r, 145 F. (2d) 1001 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944); Ece testimony of Colin F.
Starn on the British double tax, Hearings before Committee on Foreign Rclaions on H. R.
2013, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 72-73.
36. JEzE, Cotms Da FiNANCES PUBLIQUES (France, 1936) 151.
37. Bloch, L'Assistance Mutuelle en Matitre Fiscals, REvUr D- Scm;=c ET Dr Las-
LATION FLNcA1 RES (France, 1937) 159.
38. A discussion of capital movements and evasion is presented by PL&Twn, L'kvAlon
FISCALE ET L'AssiSTAICE ADmINISTRATIVE ENTRE 9TATS (1938) 122-172.
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all information which will be of assistance in enforcing taxes and not
jeopardizing other interests which each nation may have. It is, there-
fore, customary to make reservations against disclosures of trade
secrets, patents and processes and to reserve to each nation the right
to withhold information in the interests of national security. A minor
problem also arises concerning the extent of the duty which should be
laid upon the authorities of one country to secure information for those
of the other country. In most instances the sending of information
regularly coming to the authorities of the transmitting country will be
sufficient and may be provided for on an automatic basis. In individual
instances more may be necessary, and it is, therefore, desirable to allow
for request of specific information. Even in these cases the authorities
cannot be expected to do more than is customary with respect to their
own taxes, and information may be refused as unobtainable.
Cooperation in enforcement of taxes by legal processes involves not
only a balance of policy considerations but also the traditional legal
barrier to enforcement of the taxes of another jurisdiction.3" The solu-
tion which has met with the most favor is an agreement which does
not allow the authorities of the taxing jurisdiction to come into the
courts of the other country but provides that the authorities of the
latter jurisdiction shall handle the claims of the other. Only those
claims which have been finally determined in the taxing country will
be pressed in the other's courts. This eliminates any possibility of
litigation over taxability and hence any necessity for construing the
tax laws of the other country, which may be a sufficient puzzle for its
own courts. Measures of conservancy short of this may, however, be
provided on request of the authorities of the taxing jurisdiction with
respect to other tax claims. Just what this means has nowhere been
exactly defined. It may be suspected that it is more in the nature of a
sword which, hovering over the taxpayer's head, will induce him to
settle his taxes rather than risk its descent. It may be argued that the
contrariety of conservancy devices found in different countries would
make enumeration burdensome. Yet because of the possibilities of
litigation inherent in such uncerfainty and because of the economic
and social consequences attendant upon some "measures of conserv-
ancy," the subject deserves study and refinement of objectives, meth-
ods, results, and definitions.
THE ROLE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN THE FIELD OF TAXATION
Conflicts in the field of international tax relations have long been a
matter of international concern. For over a century international
agreements affecting taxation have been concluded between nations. 40
39. See note 24 supra.
40. An agreement between France and Belgium covering double taxation and tax
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The modem tax convention which includes provisions against double
taxation and fiscal evasion has been fostered by the expert work of the
Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations in the period between the
two world wars. The Second World War interrupted this vork, but
the resurgence of international trade, reform of tax systems, and the
introduction of ex-traordinary war profits taxes and capital levies
have all given new impetus to intergovernmental negotiations in the
field of taxation.
The Fiscal Committee was an outgrowth of a recommendation made
by the Economic and Financial Organization of the League of Nations
when it began to study the problem of double taxation and tax eva-
sion in 1921. From 1923 to 1928 about four leading tax experts met
at annual or biennial intervals under the auspices of the League. In
1929 this group of experts was given permanent status as the Fiscal
Committee of the League, and it operated until larch 1946 when it
was formally disbanded at a session in London. 4'
Most of the publications of the Committee deal with the prevention
of international double taxation. However, the Committee also gave
considerable attention to the prevention of fiscal evasion. The preva-
lent point of view was that agreements against fiscal evasion should be
subordinated to those against double ta-xation. 4- Moreover, it pre-
sented reports on principles of taxation 43 and on fiscal policy and eco-
nomic fluctuations.44 The most important practical contributions of
the Fiscal Committee were model treaties for the prevention of double
taxation and fiscal evasion.4 5
Most of the research work in the field of general fiscal policy was ac-
complished not by the Fiscal Committee but under the auspices of the
Delegation on Economic Depressions and other subdivisions of the
Economic, Financial and Transit Department of the League of Na-
evasion problems was concluded in 1843. On the historical development of such treaties
SELIGmA, LA DOUBLE ImpOSITION ET LA COOPERATION FISCALE I.,EWl.ATO',ALEn (1929)
45. For a text of the Franco-Belgian treaty see A. Piatier, op. cit. supra note 38, at 318-321.
41. See REPORT ON- THE WoRK OF THE TErra SEssION OF Tr FIscAL Co,,iTVEE,
League of Nations Doc. C. 37. M. 37. 1946 II. A.
42. This is brought out by CAnROLL, PRuvEvTNix OF I -rERATIOmNL DOUBLU TXA-
TION AND FiscAL. EVASION (1939) 36-37.
43. League of Nations Doc. C.384.M.229.1938. II.A (F/Fiscal 104); League of Nations
Doc. C.181.M.110.1939 II.A (F/Fiscal 120).
44. The latter study was part of a Report of June 21, 1939, League of Nations Doc.
C.181.Ml.110.1939 ILA (F/Fiscal 120) 6-16. The findings were based in part on a study
of the tax sources of thirteen countries representative of different tqpes of national eco-
nomic structure during the period from 1928-35.
45. The latest of these model treaties are the IODEL BILATERAL Co!;vETxos Fon
THE PREVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION A.ND Fiscu. EvAso, Fiscal
Committee, Second Regional Tax Conference, Mexico, July 1943, League of Nations Do=.
C.2.M.2.1945. II.A.
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tions.4 Between the study of fiscal policy in general and the limited
study of double taxation is the area of problems which has been defined
in this article as the "foreign tax policy of nations." 41 Though foreign
tax policy was the major specialty of the Fiscal Committee, the field
has also been developed by a number of private organizations, some of
which deserve high credit.
4
Private organizations representing taxpayers are, of course, pri-
marily interested in reducing taxes. Such organizations or their repre-
sentatives should not be forced into a position where they are made to
appear in a role other than that of representatives of private, financial,
commercial or industrial interests. As in all spheres of taxation, some
of the problems arising in international tax relations may require solu-
tions which hurt various private interests.
Foreign tax policy in its broader aspects must, therefore, be of inter-
est to an international organization of governments such as the United
Nations. In the long run, the governmental emphasis may become
even stronger than it was in the League of Nations insofar as the treat-
ment of governmental corporations may assume proportions as impor-
tant as that of private corporations.
The Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations did useful work,
particularly through its model treaties which, although not universally
acceptable, have served to formalize significant findings in the field of
international double taxation and tax evasion. The scope of the Com-
mittee's work can be considerably enlarged under a Fiscal Commission
such as is being planned within the framework of the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations.49
As stated in the report of the Preparatory Commission,"0 such a
bommission can study international tax problems in general, arrange
for exchange of information among states on the techniques of govern-
ment finance and on their social and economic effects, and analyze
fiscal techniques used to assist the prevention of inflation or depres-
46. Examples are to be found in the series of League of Nations publications classified
under II ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MATTERS OF INTEREST IN FISCAL POLICY. The most
important recent publication is ECoNoMic STABILITY IN THE POSTWAR WORLD (1945).
47. Ibid.
48. At least one author, the former Secretary of the Fiscal Committee, puts the work
of the International Chamber of Commerce on the same level as that of the Fiscal Com-
mittee of the League of Nations. This is evident from the following sentence: "The chance
is now offered of clinching the pioneer work of the International Chamber of Commerce
and of the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations." DEPERON, Op. cit. supra note 14,
at 5. It must also be noted that the International Chamber of Commerce was often ofli-
cially represented at sessions of the Fiscal Committee through one of its representatives
who was a corresponding member of the Committee.
49. See REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY C0MISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 23,
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sions. Moreover, it can take over such functions of the Fiscal Corn-
mittee of the League of Nations as it may decide to assume. 5'
This implies that the work of the Commission should reach beyond
the scope of foreign tax policy per se into the questions of the inter-
national repercussions of internal fiscal policies, which would open the
possibilities of linking monetary and fiscal studies within one commis-
sion or committee. Indeed, if full employment, stable exchange rates
and free flow of trade are matters of international concern in general,
then fiscal policies, too, must be a matter for international investiga-
tion. In one sense, the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations was
not really international, as the governments of the United States,
U.S.S.R. and China, to name only major nations, were without official
representation. The obvious tendencies of the United Nations' policy
and of the reports of the Preparatory Commission point toward a
broadening both of the geographical and of the functional scale of
operation of the proposed Fiscal Commission.
51. _wbi.
